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A national study
produced no evidence
that home rule
governments have higher
per capita tax revenues
or government spending

Home rule has
little effect on daily
government performance

Home rule cities and
villages have and use a
wider range of strategies
to employ in cutting
budget deficits

Communities with home
rule authority have
better bond ratings

Addison, Illinois
demonstrates how home
rule empowers actions
that can protect and
enhance the quality of
community life
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Do Home Rule Governments Work Better?
A New and Different Perspective
by Curtis Wood

Editor’s Note: Policy Profiles has discussed Illinois home rule on a number of previous
occasions, always focusing solely on the system of home rule used in Illinois. In this new
study, Professor Curtis Wood takes a different approach. His study of home rule does not
focus on any particular state, but rather gathers insights into how the use of home rule
throughout the nation affects the way that cities and villages operate. With data gathered
during the depths of the current national economic recession, the study also offers a first
look at local government responses to that downturn.
The rapidly approaching 40th anniversary of Illinois’ implementation of its own home rule
system makes this study particularly timely and appropriate.

The most contentious issue – the issue that has most frequently confronted voters in Illinois
cities and villages in the last half century – has been the desirability of local government
home rule. Indeed, the degree to which state government should decentralize power to local
government has been a source of major controversy in the United States since the end of
the Revolutionary War.1 Debates over the desirability of such decentralization of governing
power to individual Illinois municipal governments have been on-going for nearly a century.
This Policy Profile contributes to this debate with information gathered in a national study
of the consequences of local government home rule.
What is home rule?
Simply stated, home rule is a legal system for defining the powers which local government
may exercise. Local governments have no inherent powers; their ability to take any action
at all is dependent on a grant of power from the state in which they are located. Traditionally, local governments may exercise only the powers explicitly given them by state statute.
Home rule gives an individual local government – a county, city, or village – the authority to
determine for itself what powers it may exercise, subject, of course, to specified constitutional
and statutory limitations.
Home rule, thus, is a system under which individual local governments are given a broad
scope of authority to determine what powers they need, and what revenue sources they can
tap, to provide the services demanded by their residents. The scope of the powers they may
exercise, and the limitations to which they are subject, varies widely from state to state.
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What are the arguments in favor of
home rule?
Home rule is designed to give local voters,
and the local officials they elect, more
authority and control over the operation
of their local government. It does this
by freeing local governments from total
dependence on the state legislature for the
powers and authority needed to finance
and provide public services to local
communities. In short, home rule transfers
power from state legislatures to city, village,
and county governing boards, and to the
voters who elect officials to those governing
boards. The basic arguments favoring
such a transfer of power are summarized
in Table 1.

tableone

What are the arguments against home
rule?
Local opponents of home rule base
most of their opposition to home rule
powers on the fear that locally elected
officials will abuse those powers, and
especially the power to levy taxes. Other
concerns sometimes voiced by students of
government, but rarely mentioned during
local campaigns for the adoption or removal
of home rule powers, are listed in Table 2.

Persons who favor retaining state legislative authority over the powers and functions of all
local governments argue that, with home rule powers, local officials will:

Local government officials and reformers who support home rule argue that local
government officials are better able to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Assess local needs and develop solutions to local problems than are officials elected
from all over the state.
Find the best solutions to local problems because they have more familiarity with such
problems and with local residents’ preferences for how to solve them.
Promote and protect the interests of local residents.
Experiment with alternative solutions to local problems.
Promote civic education by encouraging local citizens to study issues before decisions
are made.
Allocate scarce local resources to the highest priority needs of each community.
In addition, locally elected officials can be more easily held democratically accountable
by local voters for the way in which they manage local affairs.

tabletwo

1.
2.
3.

Arguments Made Against Home Rule Powers

Act in an arbitrary and capricious manner by favoring political friends when making
policy and budgetary decisions.
Make it more difficult for state government to address regional problems.
Be deprived of the economies of scale made possible by centralized control and by the
superior expertise and technical resources available to state government.

Other concerns include suggestions that home rule will:
4.
5.

The belief that municipal officials cannot
be trusted to serve the public interest has
its roots in the era of municipal corruption
which spanned the last decades of the
nineteenth century and the early decades
of the twentieth century, chronicled by
Lincoln Stephens in his classic The Shame
of the Cities.2 Nonetheless, home rule was
one of the tools – along with paper ballots,
privacy while voting in elections, at-large
election of board and council members,
professional chief administrative officers
(city and county managers), competitive
bidding on government contracts, and
civil service – that were advanced by
those who led the national movement
for the reform of local governments.

Arguments Made in Favor of Home Rule

6.

Lead to a lack of uniformity with regard to services, structures, and actions taken by local
governments, causing inequities between and within communities.
Result in some local governments with fewer resources being unable to solve their own
problems because of such income inequalities.
Make it more difficult for state government to address regional problems.

Despite the fact that the progressive
reform movement eradicated most
municipal corruption, particularly in
governments employing professional city
and county managers, popular support
still persists for constraining municipal
government powers, especially through
limited interpretation of grants of power
and the use of state imposed restrictions
on local tax and borrowing powers.3
Have Illinois’ home rule governments
misused property taxing powers?
Four separate studies undertaken
independently by Illinois researchers have

addressed this issue. Robert Albritton4 and
James Banovetz5 examined the popular
notion that elected local officials cannot be
trusted with broad powers of taxation by
studying the use of tax powers by Illinois
local officials in Illinois home rule. The
Banovetz-Albritton study comparing home
rule and non-home rule municipalities
was undertaken 10 years after home rule
was made available by the 1970 Illinois
Constitution; and the second Banovetz
study was made 30 years after home rule
came to Illinois. The evidence from both
studies refutes the hypothesis that, given
sufficient discretion, local government
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tablethree Performance Variables Used to Measure the Use of Local
Government Powers

officials will impose unwarranted property
tax increases on their residents.
The Banovetz and Albritton study found
that, when controlling for population
size and geographic location, there was
no significant difference in the average
property tax levy for home rule and nonhome rule municipalities in Illinois.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Bond rating				
Total FY 2009 revenues/capita		
FY2009 expenditure per capita		
General Fund Deficit (if one)		
Number of performance measures used
Service quality from the perspective
of citizens
Use of performance measures

Banovetz provides evidence that 1) few
home rule communities use their home rule
powers to levy higher property taxes or levy
sales tax to the statutory limit for home rule
cities; 2) the legislature and the courts have
felt little need to restrict or constrain the
use of home rule taxing powers because,
with one exception, they have not found
significant patterns of misuse; 3) Illinois
voters have chosen to retain home rule in
25 out of 29 elections (86 percent) by an
average margin of 3-2; and 4) there have
only been two acknowledged examples
of proposed or actual unwarranted use
of home rule tax powers during Illinois’s
30 year home rule experience, and, in
both cases, the use of home rule in those
communities was taken away by the
affected communities’ voters.6

and home rule status as the explanatory
(independent) variable, Judy A. Temple’s
empirical model treated home rule status
as the response variable.9 Temple found
empirical support for an inverse statistical
relationship between property tax growth
and the likelihood of retaining state controls
(P=.02), controlling for population.
She explains that the rapid increases in
property tax burdens per capita likely led
residents in municipalities less than 25,000
in population to vote to adopt home rule
status as a means of broadening the local tax
base and potentially obtaining property tax
relief. Temple also found that residents in
home rule and non-home rule communities
were as likely to retain non-home rule as
choose home rule regardless of the amount
of property taxes levied per capita.

The third Illinois longitudinal statistical
study, conducted by Richard F. Dye
and Therese J. McGuire,7 supports the
Banovetz and Albritton finding there is no
difference between home rule and nonhome cities regarding the use of property
tax powers in Illinois. James Banovetz
contends that the null results of the Dye and
McGuire study show that Illinois municipal
officials in home rule communities, with
unlimited property taxing powers, do not
abuse their authority; they do not levy
more property taxes than non-home rule
municipalities.8

There have been no studies published since
home rule became effective in Illinois
which would question or dispute these
findings about the use of home rule powers
to levy property taxes.

While the Banovetz/Albritton and Dye/
McGuire studies treated the fiscal variables
as the response (dependent) variables

3

How have home rule communities used
their expanded powers on other matters?
To answer this question, using the broadest
possible focus for the study, a national
survey was distributed in the summer of
2010 to determine whether there have
been differences in performance between
communities that operate using broad
grants of discretionary powers from
their respective state governments and
communities that operate within more
traditional, limited grants of such powers.

•
•
•
•
•
•

FY2010 property tax levy/capita
Change in General Fund revenue/capita
FY2009 FTE employees/1,000 population
Number of deficit reducing strategies used
Performance effects of cutbacks
Quality of state-local relations

A total of 269 municipalities from 43
states completed the survey. Appendix A
describes the study used to measure the
range of powers being used by each of the
surveyed municipalities.
What did the survey find about the use
of home rule powers?
On a national basis, the study found that
the daily management of governmental
affairs is little affected by the scope of
government powers. Undertaken during
the governmental fiscal crisis brought on
by the “Great Recession” of 2008-10, the
national study found that, to use Illinois
terms, the presence or absence of home
rule had little effect on the government
performance variables of most interest
and concern to citizens, but communities
with home rule powers were able to use
a broader range of strategies to reduce
governmental deficits.
The study correlated the breadth of
municipal discretion (home rule) with
13 variables which measure municipal
government performance. These variables
are listed in Table 3. Many of these
variables describe performance measures
of high interest to citizens, such as taxes
and expenditures per capita.
How were home rule cities different
from non-home rule cities in this
national study?
Home rule cities performed better than
non-home rule cities in three significant
categories. Home rule cities:

4
•
•
•
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Had better bond ratings
Used more deficit reduction strategies
Established better relations with state
officials, leading to greater use of state
expertise and resources to solve their
problems.

The first significant finding of the study is
that public officials in municipalities with
broader powers (e.g., home rule powers)
were able to use more innovative strategies
to reduce local government deficits. They
were also able to diversify the kinds of taxes
used to raise revenues and keep borrowing
costs down by more flexible use of their
bonding authority. This corresponds with
Illinois’ experience in which home rule
communities have more diversified tax
bases and make more extensive use of lower
cost borrowing options.
In what ways were home rule and nonhome rule cities shown to be the same
in the study?
Table 4 lists the 10 variables studied
in which municipal performance was
unaffected by the breadth of the powers
granted to the municipality (in other words,
where the presence of home rule powers
had no effect on municipal performance).
As shown in Table 4, in the national study of
269 cities, the presence or absence of home
rule powers did not have any significant
measurable effect on:
•
•
•
•

Total revenues collected by home rule
and non-home rule communities
Property taxes levied by the home rule
and non-home rule communities
Government expenditures
Citizens’ views of the quality of
services

What does the study show about home
rule’s effect on taxation and borrowing?
The findings of the national study
correspond with what has happened in

Northern Illinois University

tablefour Performance Variables Unaffected by the Presence of
Home Rule
				
•
Total FY 2009 revenues/capita		
•
Use of performance variables
•
FY 2009 expenditures/capita		
•
Effects of cutbacks on service performance
•
FTE Employees/1,000 people
•
General Fund deficit (if one existed)
•
Number of performance measures used •
Changes in General Fund revenue/capita
•
Citizen perception of service quality
•
FY 2009 property tax levy/capita

Illinois. Cities and villages with home rule
powers have broader tax powers: they have
fewer restrictions on their property tax
powers; they have broader powers to levy
other taxes (except income taxes which
in Illinois they may not levy) and broader
power to incur debt. This leads to three
consequences:
First, communities with broad taxing
powers levy more different kinds of taxes,
but neither their property tax levies nor their
total tax revenues, measured on a per person
basis, are higher. Home rule communities
are using their broader taxing powers, not
to raise more money, but to keep property
taxes from going up even faster.
Second, the study showed that cities and
villages with broader powers have higher
bond ratings, a key indicator of sound and
conservative financial management that
reflects positively on communities’ fiscal,
economic, and managerial performance.
The positive link between more powers
and better bond ratings is even stronger for
municipalities over 2,500 in population.

•

Third, the study results also suggest
that municipalities with more power are
more likely to have lower deficits; lower
borrowing costs; and enjoy more financial,
technical, managerial, and political
assistance from state officials to combat
local or regional challenges.
How does home rule help municipalities
control deficits and reduce the size of
government?
The study found that municipal officials
who desire more deficit-reducing options
can use their enlarged powers toward that
end:
1.

2.

This suggests that with more flexible and
broader financial authority, cities and
villages use that power to:
3.
•
•

Expand the sources of revenue
available to them;
Use the absence of a legal debt limit to

make better use of general obligation
bonds to finance working capital; and
Manage tax and expenditure levels
more wisely.

To reduce their property tax levy,
municipal officials can take advantage
of the increased options they already
have to expand and diversify their
community’s tax base.
Expenditures can be reduced by using
their government’s authority to reduce
the number or scope of their service
responsibilities or to devise alternative
service delivery methods.
Municipal officials who want to
increase the probability of avoiding a
deficit and diversify or increase their
General Fund revenues can focus their
attention on improving the quality of
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their relationships with state officials.
They can also work more closely
with state officials, and work more
closely with other municipalities
through professional associations
such as the International City and
County Management Association,
Government Finance Officers’
Association, National League of
Cities, the National Association
of Budget Officers, the League of
Municipalities, and other professional
associations. With more flexible
powers, they can more easily utilize
the tools proven more successful in
other communities.

in the community – about one-third of all
residential units in the community were
occupied by tenants. Most apartment
buildings were under individual ownership
– many such owners were part-time, nonprofessional, and non-residents of the
community. There was neither uniform
maintenance or leasing standards nor
homeowners’ associations to help ensure
adequate property maintenance. Lacking
any clear statutory authority to address
the issue, the Village used its home rule
powers in an effort to establish a minimum
level of property maintenance standards
and a healthy living environment in the
rental units.

Did the study find any relationship between
home rule and municipal performance?
The 22 municipalities reporting the greatest
use of broad powers were each asked,
in a follow-up question, to describe and
evaluate one activity or project they had
undertaken that would not have been
possible without their broad (i.e. home
rule) grant of powers. Ten responded to
the question. Their responses provided
evidence that their home rule powers had
enabled them to undertake projects which
enhanced their communities’ quality of
life, economic prosperity, fiscal health, and
performance in ways that would not have
been possible without the broad kinds of
powers made available by home rule or
some other similar broad grant of power
by the state.

Initially, the Village inspected every unit
once a year and assessed licensing fees
to cover municipal costs. Over the years
the Village has been challenged in court
by landlords and tenants, for violating
their individual rights, but the Village has
always prevailed. In the late 1990’s, the
Village revised the program significantly
to provide incentives for landlords to invest
in and maintain their buildings. The Village
established a scoring system for inspections
and categorized buildings as “Very Good”,
“Good”, and “Unacceptable.” Rentals
classified as “Very Good” have their
inspections and fees waived the following
year; “Good” rentals have one inspection
per year and an additional exterior-only
inspection; and “Unacceptable” properties
have a second inspection the same year and
two additional exterior-only inspections.
Fees are charged for all “re-inspections.”

The experience of the Village of Addison,
Illinois (est. 2008 population of 39,917) is
a case in point. Addison had the fifteenth
highest total municipal discretion score in
this study. Thirty years ago, the village used
its home rule powers to develop a rental
licensing and inspection program designed
specifically to protect and enhance the
quality of life in the community. At that
time, Addison had over 4,300 rental units

The message to landlords has been to
invest in their buildings rather than pay
fees. Evidence suggests that the incentive
program has been very successful: the
percentage of “Very Good” rental units
has increased from about 20 percent of all
rental units to about 30 percent, and the
percentage of “Unacceptable” rental units
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has decreased from about 20 percent to
10-12 percent.
Last year, the Village added a Crime-Free
Multi-Family Training Program (Program)
that trains landlords on tenant selection and
other management issues. So far, about 90
percent of the landlords have completed
the program training. The Village has also
recently resurrected the Landlord and
Tenant Commission with the purpose of
strengthening communication between
landlords, tenants, and the Village.
According to John Berley, the Director
of Community Development in Addison,
“Addison’s rental neighborhoods have
improved immensely over the years as a
result of the rental licensing and inspection
program. The program has also made it
possible to maintain the increasing number
of single family rentals in the community
due to foreclosures. Without home rule, the
Village could not have done any of this.”10
Addison’s experience with the use of this
program to maintain the quality of the
community’s rental housing supply has
been copied by a number of other home
rule governments in Illinois. This particular
use of home rule power has also generated
opposition to Illinois’ system of home rule
by some state wide realtors’ associations.
Conclusion
This study, based on a national survey of
municipalities comparing municipalities
with broad powers to those with more
restricted powers, found no evidence that
officials in municipalities with broad grants
of power from the state, such as home rule,
misuse those powers. Municipalities with
more tax and borrowing powers did not levy
higher taxes per capita and they enjoyed
better credit ratings. Thus, there is no reason
to believe that increasing local government
powers would cause or lead public officials

6
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to become less trustworthy, responsible,
responsive, fair, or effective in using their
governmental powers or fulfilling their
governmental responsibilities.
Proponents of municipal discretion – home
rule – can thus make the case that the results
of this study offer evidence that home
rule government is no more likely to lead
to financial mismanagement, but is more
likely to foster programs that protect and
enhance the quality of community life.
Finally, this study offers the first real
evidence that home rule communities, with
their more flexible powers, are better able
to use more deficit-reducing strategies to
reduce the budget deficit and control the
growth of government.

Appendix A: Survey Methodology
Because municipalities vary in their fiscal,
cultural, economic, historic, political, and
social characteristics, it is also likely that
they might vary in the way their government
officials use the powers of their office. An
index was developed that makes it possible
to measure municipal discretion across
municipalities. The municipal discretion
index includes 22 indicators across five
categories. A municipality can earn up to 25
points for each indicator. The scores for the
indicators in each category are averaged.
The scores for the five categories are added
to come up with a total discretion score for
each municipality. A maximum municipal
discretion score of 125 is possible for each
municipality. The higher the municipal
discretion score, the more municipal
discretion (home rule) that is permitted
by the state and used by the municipality.
Table A-1 on the next page, describes
the five categories and 22 indicators
comprising the municipal discretion index.

Research methods
The study, conducted in summer 2010,
examined whether there has been a
difference in performance between
empowered and less empowered
municipalities. With the assistance of the
International City/County Management
Association, an on-line survey of city
managers in municipalities over 2,500
in population was conducted. Out of the
3,014 city managers contacted by ICMA,
269 municipalities from 43 U.S. states
completed the online survey, for a response
rate of 9 percent. Because the response rate
of the survey was only about 9 percent, the
author analyzed whether the 269 respondent
municipalities were representative of
18,213 U.S. municipalities over 2,500 in
population. The analysis demonstrates that
the sample is significantly over represented
in all population classifications above 5,000
persons and significantly underrepresented
in the 2,500-4,999 population. Therefore,
the results of the study cannot be
generalized beyond the study sample.
The relationship between municipal
discretion and 13 performance variables
was tested, controlling for 2008 estimated
population, percent of population growth
from 2000 through 2008, population
density, form of government, region,
poverty level, per capita income, percent
that have a college degree or higher,
race, and political culture. Table 3 in the
text (page 3) shows the 13 performance
variables used in this study.
The author also invited the city managers
(administrators) in the 22 municipalities
with the highest total municipal discretion
scores to describe and explain one project/,
program, or initiative that would not
have been possible but for the home rule
authority granted by state officials, the
support and will of the elected officials,
citizens, and staff expertise. City managers

Northern Illinois University

were also asked to evaluate the impact of the
project/program/initiative on the municipal
organization and community.
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Municipal Discretion Index Categories, Indicators, and Points

1. Legal Definition
		
a. Scope of legal home rule authority. City Charter (25); State Constitution (20); State law/charter (15); State law (10); None
2.

Structural
a. Number of state mandates. None (25); Few (15); Many (0)
b. Authority to exempt itself from a state statute? Yes (25); No (0)
c. Has the municipality exempted itself from a state statute? Yes (25); No (0)
d. How often has the state enacted special legislation that constrains municipal discretion? Never (25); Occasionally (15); Frequently (0)
e. How often has the state enacted special legislation that expands municipal discretion? Frequently (25); Occasionally (15); Never (0)
f. Difficulty of annexation. Only city ordinance (25); city ordinance and public hearing (20); Property owners affected by annexation
must petition the city or a village-wide vote is required (15); Annexation must be approved by the county, a special commission,
state legislators, administrative judge, or a state agency (10); Annexation is permitted by law but is not possible due to no
unincorporated territory surrounding the city (5); and annexation not permitted by state law (0)

3.

Functional
a. The number of programs/initiatives used by the municipality (13 programs/initiatives were identified in the survey). One point for each
program. Thirteen or more programs earn the maximum 25 points.
b. Number of functional responsibilities permitted and used by municipalities. 26 functions/services were identified in the survey plus an
option to list other functions performed by the municipality. One point for each function, not to exceed 25 points
c. Number of approaches to intergovernmental cooperation used by a municipality. 22 methods were identified in the survey plus an
option to specify other approaches used. One point for each intergovernmental approach used. 20 or more intergovernmental
approaches is equivalent to 25 points.
d. Types of economic development initiatives used by the municipality. 15 types of economic development initiatives were identified in
the survey. One point earned for each initiative through 10 initiatives. Two additional points given for each additional initiative from
11-16 initiatives. 17 or more economic development initiatives earns (25 points)

4.

Fiscal
a. Is your municipality subject to a state mandated property tax lid? No
(25) and Yes (0)
b. Is your municipality subject to a state mandated expenditure lid? No (25) and Yes (0)
c. Does the municipality have authority to issue bonds for working capital? Yes (25) and No (0)
d. Does the state government require the municipality to approve a balanced budget? No (25) and Yes (0)
e. What is the municipality’s general obligation debt limit according to state law? No debt limit (25); Over 100% of AV (22); 30%-100%
of AV (19); 20-29.99% of AV (14);10-19.99% of AV (9);1-9.99% of AV (4); 0% of AV (0)
f. What percent of the statutory general obligation debt limit is the municipality’s current outstanding debt? 100% (25); 80-99.99% (20);
60-79.99% (15); 40-59.99% (10); 20-39.99% (5); 10-19.99% (3);1-9.99% (2); and 0% (0).
g. The number of revenue sources used by the municipality. 32 revenue sources were identified in the survey. Respondents could also
identify other revenue sources used by the municipality. 25 or more revenue sources (25); one point for each revenue source used
through 24 revenue sources.

5.

Municipal Officials’ Influence with State Officials (4 indicators that can earn a maximum average of 25 points)
a. Rate the level of success that municipal officials have with state legislators regarding preservation/enhancement of municipal
discretion? High (25); Moderate (15); Low (5); None (0).
b. Rate the level of success that municipal officials have with the Governor regarding preservation/enhancement of municipal discretion?
High (25); Moderate (15); Low (5); None (0)
c. Rate the level of success that municipal officials have with state bureaucrats regarding preservation/enhancement of municipal
discretion? High (25); Moderate (15); Low (5);None (0)
d. Rate how influential professional organizations are with state officials regarding preserving/enhancing municipal discretion. High (25);
Moderate (15); Low(5); Not influential at all (0)
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